Introduction
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in 'the region' from a variety of both intellectual and practical perspectives, with the result that regional studies are once again of central concern. This re-emergence to centre stage has reflected a number of developments. On the one hand, from being consigned for many years to the murky margins of the history of geographical thought, somewhat surprisingly the region has come to occupy a central place in both social scientific discourse and political debates. At the same time as it has experienced a revived status in geography, the F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 3 significance of the region -and, more generally of the spatial constitution of economies and societies -came to be recognised as a critical issue in much of the social sciences: for example, in the core disciplines of economics (KRUGMAN, 2000) , politics (KEATING et al, 2003) and sociology (URRY, 1985) as well as in more applied areas of the social sciences such as business studies (for example, PORTER, 2003; SNOWDON and STONEHOUSE, 2006) . Related to this, in the context of policy and practice, the region has become seen as a -even the -key territorial unit in an era of (neo)liberal globalisation, the "imagined unit of competition" (LOVERING, 1998, 392) , linked to a variety of measures to devolve responsibility for regional socio-economic development and well-being to the regional level.
Not surprisingly, however, views have often differed quite sharply as to how best to think about the region and about the merits of a regional approach to issues of governance and economic development, both between and among politicians, citizens and intellectuals of various allegiances. For example, in
June 2006 the citizens of Catalonia voted for a significant extension of powers to the regional (or as many of them would see it, Catalan national) scale in a further step in the evolution of asymmetric federalism in Spain. This in turn provoked a spate of similar demands in several other Spanish regions (Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, Galicia, and Valencia -the Basque country already had greater autonomy than Catalonia) which feared that they would lose out as a result of greater autonomy in Catalonia. At the same time, the Catalan vote generated fears from other, smaller regions, with weaker claims to historic nationhood (such as Castile and Aragon), that they would lose out an economic definition of the region, especially in terms of state economic management, rather than a regional political identity per se, the population decisively rejected proposals for an elected Regional Assembly and an enhanced degree of devolution to the region. However, those voting against were something of an unholy alliance -some voted against because of opposition to greater devolution per se, others because they favoured devolution but felt that what was on offer was a weak and problematic set of proposals that would be inadequate to begin effectively to tackle the developmental problems of the region. Furthermore, there were genuine fears that the proposed Assembly would simply offer central government an excuse to lay the blame for the region's continuing problems on people in the region, a classic example of 'blaming the victim'. Which viewpoint was correct, both in north east England and the various Spanish regions (if indeed one can talk in those terms on such an issue), is not the point. The point is that 'the region' had again become central to political debate, both as an object of state policy and as a putative subject shaping and implementing state policy but with sharply divergent views as to both the efficacy and indeed propriety of the region as both subject and object of policy. At the same time, however, there has been a (not so?) subtle change in language and the linguistic representation of the region: formerly "lagging" regions are re-cast as "underperforming" or "challenged" (BOSANQUET et al, 2006) , while the emphasis Similar divergences of view points and differences in emphasis are to be found amongst academics interested in regional issues and uneven development. In part, these can be related to exploration of a range of evolutionary and institutional perspectives on regions and regional development that have allowed more nuanced interpretations of the constitution of regions and regional development trajectories (for example, see AMIN, 1999; HUDSON, 2005; MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2006) . In this, a variety of scholars have built upon the insights provided by Marxian political economy -in particular an understanding of the way in which regional uneven development is structurally and necessarily inscribed within capitalist development (HARVEY, 1982) so that capital constantly "see-saws" between regions in search of enhanced profits (SMITH, 1984) -to provide more subtle elaborations of the relationship between the trajectories of individual regions and the broader map of regional uneven development and the processes through which the specificities of particular regions are constructed -an issue on which MASSEY's (1984) work was seminal.
However, unsurprisingly, opening up this conceptual space has produced a variety of -sometimes competing -views rather than a consensus on one.
For some, regions have become the key territorial units in an era of globalisation (for example, see SCOTT, 1998; STORPER, 1995) , although, arguably, the focus on the region is being replaced by a revived interest in city-regions as the pivotal territorial unit (see SCOTT and STORPER, 2003; OECD, 2006) . In either case, however, the emphasis is placed firmly upon endogenous growth processes, regional institutions and regionally-specific knowledges and learning -in short, on what has been termed the Territorial
Innovations Models perspective on regional development (MOULAERT and SEKIA, 2003) . Often, however, such claims are seen to be based upon empirically insubstantial evidence (MARKUSEN, 1999) . In contrast, others would dispute this alleged primacy of the region and, on theoretical as well as empirical grounds, insist that the national remains the key scale (for example, see PIKE and TOMANEY, 2004) and that the significance of the regions as a pivotal site of capital accumulation, economic growth and governance has been over-emphasised, as has been the significance of knowledge and learning (for example, see HUDSON, 1999) . The issue is not that the region is -or has suddenly become -unimportant but rather that any prioritising of the region as the pivotal spatial scale and territorial unit should be based upon careful and theoretically grounded empirical research rather than sweeping arm waving assertion based upon thin empirics (although as I have argued elsewhere, it is important to recognise the varying qualitative as well as quantitative forms that valid evidence can take: see HUDSON, 2003) .
Certainly there are instances of regions that can seen as economically very successful -at least for some of their residents -as, for example, the case of Spain reveals but this is a far cry from the assertion that because some regions are successful, all can be successful in a 'win-win' world of bottom-up endogenous regional growth. Secondly, there are concepts of regions as objects of policy versus those of regions as subjects that influence, make and implement policy. However, to see these only as either/or choices is counter-productive and would lead the study of regions and their development into a number of spacious, but ultimately unproductive, cul-de-sacs. Rather than take an either/or perspective on these dichotomies, therefore, I argue that these must be seen from a both/and perspective, and that, crucially, which of these perspectives is chosen or given most weight depends -or at least should depend -upon the theoretical, political and practical contexts in which these choices are made.
As such, they also depend upon issues of power and, more specifically, who has the power of decision in a number of key contexts.
The concept of power is a tricky one, with a range of views as to how best to think about power. As I have recently discussed these issues elsewhere (for example, see HUDSON, 2006b) I will not repeat that discussion here, other than to say that, drawing on the work of ALLEN (2003, 2004) , three concepts of power can be identified. These varying conceptions stress different aspects 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 8 of power and the processes through which it is constituted and produced so that different conceptions allow an illumination of different aspects of power and their relevance to regional issues. The first conception, drawing on critical realism, is a 'centred' one of power as an inscribed capacity of individuals or institutions, which possess power by virtue of their constitutive social relationships and which they can exercise as 'power over' others. The second conception of power is a 'networked' conception. Power is conceived as a resource for achieving diverse ends, emphasising 'power to' and the ways in which power is generated to achieve desired outcomes rather than how power constrains action. The third conception of power is Foucauldian and diagrammatic. Power is conceived as a technology -a series of strategies, techniques and practices -that works on subjects. It is exercised though groups or organisations rather than being held or possessed by them or centred in them. Power is conceptualised as fluid and relational, exercised from innumerable points within civil society, the economy and the state -thus many agencies and institutions are involved within productive networks of power rather than power being seen as resting only in the state and its agencies.
While recognising the value of these different conceptions of power, ALLEN (2003) nonetheless sees them as inadequate and flawed in various ways. In particular, he argues that power is not a 'thing' but rather must be understood as a relational effect of social interaction inseparable from its effects, expressed via diverse and specific modalities of power, each with its own particularities and specificities, constituted differently in time and space. He 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Potsdammer Platz in Berlin -in relation to the (re)production of regions.
Equally , however, it is important to remember the sites -and structural relations -from which and through which these different modalities of power emanate ands are exercised.
In the remainder of this paper I examine four, to a degree inter-weaving, sets of key questions in the context of a concern with who has the power of decision, in both intellectual debates and regional policy and practice. First, how is the region to be defined? Secondly, how can the concept of governmentality deepen our understanding of regions? Thirdly, how are 'the region's interests' to be defined? And finally, how is regional economic development to be defined? Problematising what we mean by the terms 'region' and 'development' in these ways and posing and exploring questions such as these will allow the study of regions to be taken forward in a progressive manner in the future.
Subject or object of policy: how and by whom is the region to be defined? Typically, the construction of the region as an object of (national) state policy relies upon two processes. First, the demarcation of regional boundaries -the metaphorical drawing of lines on the ground that mark out the space of the region and/or the construction of material markers to denote, literally 'on the ground', where one region ends and another begins. Regions in this sense are literally "marked out" (cf. THRIFT, 2002) . Secondly, the specification of a series of statistical indicators that allows the socio-economic profile of the region to be defined. Equally, these indicators allow changes in this profile, in the region's development and in the extent to which it is defined as 'problematic' -as defined by these measures -to be assessed. As these are essentially central state policies for regions, such decisions about the drawing of boundaries, the definition of criteria against which regions are defined as problematic or not, and the monitoring of the state of regions against these criteria are taken (no doubt typically with some perfunctory consultation with relevant social actors in the regions) by central state ministries and agencies.
In them rests the authority to assume this power of decision. While these may have administrative offices in the regions (as for example, with the post-1994 This can involve challenges from within regions to the authority of central government and to existing regional boundaries, and/or challenges over the criteria used to define regions, and/or challenges as to the existing order in terms of who has the power to decide matters of regional interest and concern. However, while there may have been 'bottom up' pressures from within regions, in part a consequence of the powers of seduction and the economic costs in the form of efficiency disadvantages, equity-related drawbacks and institutional burdens. Furthermore, many of the disadvantageous effects are contingent upon which actors are driving devolutionary policies and, as a result, the specific from that devolution takes.
(RODRIGUES-POSE and GILL, 2005).
These varied pressures for devolution have certainly reinforced or even, in some cases, initiated tendencies to shift regulatory practices from the national level and so qualitatively change relationships between national and regional levels. It is, however, important not to overstate the extent of such changes. There is a long-established sub-national territorial structure to state power in many capitalist states in response to requirements for administrative efficiency and political legitimacy, to say nothing of smooth accumulation. There are clear examples demonstrating that the power to shape policies for regions has been shifted more to the regional level -as in Spain -with greater decentralisation, to some regions at least, of the power to decide and of the resources to implement important not to overstate the extent to which the "power to decide" and commensurate resources have been devolved to regions as opposed to the regional scale remaining one of importance for the administration of national policies for the regions. It is worth emphasising that regional devolution involves relative shifts in responsibility and power of decision and that these are heavily circumscribed precisely because national states retain their authority and the power to make decisions as the extent and form of devolution.
As well as such scalar shifts, there has also often been a re-definition of the boundaries of state activities associated with a change in emphasis from government to governance in systems of governing. Regulatory capacities have been shifted "outwards" to non-state or 'quasi-state' organisations with enhanced significance placed upon social practices beyond the state. A range of organisations and institutions within civil society has been incorporated into processes of governance. This has been particularly associated with the promotion of network concepts and networked forms of regional governance (HADJIMICHALIS and HUDSON, 2006) . The growing emphasis on governance is recognition of the increasing importance -or perhaps more accurately is increasing recognition of the importance -of the institutions of civil society in is not the demise but the character of the national state, the dominant modalities through which it continues to exercise power, the type of regulatory régime that it maintains, the geometry of that régime and the extent to which it involves 
Regions and governmentality
The Foucauldian concept of governmentality (for example, see FOUCAULT, 1991; DEAN, 1999) further illuminates the processes of reorganising the state and attempts to create the region as a political subject and the regional as a new -or perhaps more accurately re-defined -scale of governing. While the emphasis on the national as the dominant space and spatial scale of regulation can be seen as expressive of one governmentality and ensemble of varying modalities of power, the shift to concepts of multi-level governance and of re-defined boundaries between economy, civil society and state in the processes of governing can be seen as both indicative and constitutive of an alternative governmentality and combination of modalities. Not least, the spatial object of policy and the spaces of governing are seen to encompass more than just the national. Acknowledging this, however -as exemplified by the cases of Spain and the UK described in the introductory section -the shift towards regions as modes and scales of governing remains contested, partial and uneven in its development.
By conjoining 'government' and 'mentality' in a productive alliance, governmentality therefore emphasises the practical 'how' of governing and the structures of government and governing, the way in which the thought involved in the practices of government is collective and relatively taken-for- distance", governmentality "is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise" (MACKINNON, 2000, 296) and the authority that this provides. The purpose of deploying expertise is to enact "assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through the countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement" rather than to seek to weave "an all-pervasive web of 'social control'". Moreover, space is an important element of governmentality, precisely because such governmental activities are territorially-demarcated. For in order to "to govern it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised. And this is not simply a matter of looking: space has to be re-presented, marked out" (THRIFT, 2002, 205) , emphasising that regions need to be defined, represented and their boundaries (literally or metaphorically) marked out, as both objects and subjects of governing.
This focuses attention upon those with the power to define and represent in these ways. Rather than unquestioningly accept the claims of those who assert their right to speak for the region, the spotlight is turned on their activities, the modalities of power that they deploy in pursuit of this rightmanipulation and coercion as much as, if not more than, authority and domination -and the basis on which they claim the right to act in this way problematises. In short, the black box of the region is opened up in order to explain how it can perform as a political subject with shared regional interests via uncovering the bases of the formation of a dominant or hegemonic regional bloc. The creation of such a cohesive regional bloc is a result of the successful realisation of specific regional projects that unite diverse social actors, with otherwise differing or competing interests, around a distinct line of action that becomes defined as the regional interest. However, achieving such unity is always a contingent matter. As such, unity is always provisional. Even if unity is achieved and maintained for a time, however, there is no guarantee that such projects will always and only have their intended effects precisely because of the inability to anticipate the emergent properties of practices.
The concept of governmentality has several further significant consequences relating to issues of regions, regional policies and regional devolution. The first relates to the constitution of the objects, subjects and spaces of government. For example, regional economies are constituted via regional statistics, which have a key role in 'making economies visible' and constituting them as objects for policy action. The capability to decide upon these defining statistical measures is clearly a critical issue. Secondly, LATOUR (1987, emphasises the key role of "centres of calculation", critical nodes in which information on distant objects is brought together, compared, combined, and aggregated via use of mathematical and statistical techniques, thereby enabling government to "act at a distance" on objects, such as regions, through its programmes and policies. Put slightly differently, "through a process of mobilization, the truth claims of accredited authority figures, under the guise of neutrality and efficiency, set out the norms of conduct that enable MacKinnon, 2000, 309) . However, there is no guarantee that targets will be attained (witness the continuing problematic status of many peripheral regions). Moreover, granting a degree of autonomy to enable regions to become political subjects also creates the possibility of forming enclosures, tightly bound sites of vigorously defended professional expertise that are resistant to the wishes of government (ROSE and MILLER, 1991) . Thus an unintended consequence of empowering experts "in and for" regions may be to create the capacity to resist the intentions of central government towards those regions as objects of its policies. There may well be irreconcilable differences between "authority voices" (O'MALLEY, 2000) , the 'experts'
enrolled by national and regional organisations, respectively. Equally, it may create capacity, or at least the space in which such capacity might emerge and evolve, for the elaboration -although not necessarily the implementation -of alternative regional projects, indicative of the more general contradictory tendencies that plague state policies. However, such creative capacity may well be lacking of fail to emerge in the space created for it, especially in those regions that have a history of economic decline and selective put-migration of their most talented residents. As a result of this, and institutional sclerosis, there may well be a lack of research capacity to analyse and interpret developmental tendencies and design context-specific policies that best suit the situation of specific regions in the face of these broader forces, even when given the chance to do so (for example, see OECD, 2006). As a result, regions -or, more precisely, key actors in government departments and organisations and related development bodies drawn from the cast of 'usual In the previous section, I emphasised that the construction of a region as a socio-material ensemble and of a 'regional interest' is always, necessarily, provisional, precisely because it is the product of a social process. Indeed, this process may well involve conflict and differing views and, as JESSOP (1990) emphasises, objects (and one might add, subjects) of regulation are not fully constitutes prior to the struggles over their regularisation but are partially constituted through them. Essentialist conceptions of regions are no longer intellectually tenable. Regions are not 'out there' waiting to be discovered. They are socially constructed, both discursively and materially, in relation to specific criteria. However, it is important to acknowledge that political actors and particular interest groups may seek to define and defend regions in essentialist terms and it is important to understand why this is so, and this is relevant in relation to arguments about regions and regional development. Not least, the claim that regions can and should become active subjects rather than passive objects of policy often rests on assertions as to This relational approach therefore provides a way of thinking that challenges the view of the region as a coherent bounded territorial entity and discloses a region which is by no means necessarily a whole, with the characteristics of coherence which that term implies; nor is it necessarily a bounded and closed entity. Thinking about a region in terms of stretched out social relationships reveals a complex and unbounded lattice of articulations constructed through and around relations of power and inequality. It is a discontinuous lattice, 1998, 55-6). While the region becomes the nexus of a variety of social relationships and of modalities of power, the spatial reach of these relationships differs and therefore there can be no presumption that regional boundaries defined on the basis of different criteria will coincide. Each relational network has its own spatial reach, but while these may not be coincident, they may nonetheless mutually influence one another. Intraregional heterogeneity and discontinuity implies that, metaphorically, the fabric of regions is torn and ragged. Consequently, the issue is not how and whether to draw lines around regions but to seek to understand the processes through which they are (re)produced (HUDSON, 1990).
There is no doubt that thinking about regions in these relational terms is productive. However, ALLEN et al. (1998, 143) have gone further and claimed that an adequate understanding of regions can "only" come about through
conceptualising them as open, discontinuous, relational and internally diverse, thereby dismissing the notion of regions as bounded territories and suggesting that the territorial and the relational are either/or conceptions ii .
There is undoubtedly ample empirical evidence that, on average, the frequency, intensity and spatial reach of such extra-regional connections have tended to increase as the social relationships of capitalism have become more stretched and re-defined spaces in new ways. However, the density and geography of linkages can decline as well as increase in particular regionsfor example, because of devalorisation and disinvestment decisions by How is regional economic development to be defined?
For much of the time and for many people, the definition of regional economic development is a non-issue: the meaning and substance of 'the economy' is seen as self-evident. The development of a regional economy is defined by growth in output, especially productivity and output per caput, and if this is accompanied by some growth in employment, so much the better. However, the key indicators of development are output and productivity -or in other words, regional economic development is defined as regional economic growth, and growth in the formal mainstream economy at that. There is nothing inherently 'wrong' with such a definition but it does severely circumscribe thinking about, and the definitions of, both 'economy' and 'development'. Given this rather emaciated and limited mainstream definition of economic development, it is important to recognise that many regions are doomed to under-perform against centrally-set targets and in relation to national growth rates. Uneven development is an integral component of capitalist economies and while some regions will exceed national (or other) ). This emphasises that regions, both in general and in relation to particular regions, are amenable to multiple simultaneous representation, as both "winners" and "losers", "successful" and "failing", depending upon the audience, context and purpose. economy. It is, therefore, important that the economy be re-thought to include rather than exclude them and for regional development policy to reflect this movement. Put another way, re-thinking "the economy" in these ways foregrounds the central political question of "who counts in the economy?"
There is some evidence of exploring such policy solutions and conceptions but, typically, very much as a last resort, part of a politics of despair to be tried only when all else has failed in problem regions. Often such moves reflect deep concern by national (and to a degree in the EU, supra-national quasi-)
states to legitimate their own position by being seen to act (if not care), of having tried the mainstream solutions and found them seriously wanting, to be 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 While recognising the positive developmental potential that may, therefore, be embodied in a 'regional' approach to development, it is equally important to recognise the limits to the regional, and insist that the national state continues to acknowledge its responsibilities for the social and economic well-being of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 PIKE and TOMANEY, 2004, 2093) . Acknowledging the force of this point, however, it is equally important to stress that the state apparatus cannot be simply and non-problematically 'captured' to address the needs of the mass of the population of peripheralised regions. The key issues then become the architecture of the system of governing, the social bases of power and its distribution, and the modalities of the power relations between the regional and national within, but also beyond, the structures of the state.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, it is vital that re-thinking of the region acknowledges and seeks to deal with two messy but vital political realities. First, the enduring dilemmas of seeking to pursue simultaneously a politics of recognition that recognises respects the legitimacy of regional identities and peoples' identification with "their region" and one of redistribution that seeks to reduce, if not eliminate, material disparities in economic well-being and living conditions between regions (see Fraser, 1995) . Secondly, that this re-thinking escapes the myth of a unified (and unifying) regional interest and explicitly acknowledges the existence different - 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 In this context it is worth noting the radical experiments in "participatory budgeting" that originated in Porto Alegre in Brazil in the late 1980s and subsequently diffused to other locations, including several in Europe (see HADJIMICHALIS and HUDSON, 2007) . Via this process of radical redefinition of the democratic involvement, citizens are actively involved in the decision-making processes that shapew the regions in which they live.
Conclusions?
'Conclusions' is perhaps rather too grand a term so let me simply end by saying that it seems to me that in thinking about the future of studies of the region and regional development, these are some of the sorts of issues that debate. Above all, they are -and need to be seen as -political issues that, moreover, often raise quite profound questions about modalities of power, the nature of politics and the political process itself. On the one hand, regions and the people resident in them have typically been seen as both subjects vulnerable to the whim of capital's (dis)investment decisions and as the objects of state policies that, ostensibly at least, were intended to counter the worst effects of capital flight and place specific devalorisation. On the other hand, moves to decentralise responsibility -and maybe even power and resources, or perhaps more accurately, as ALLEN (2003) would have it, the effects of power that resources of various sorts enable -to regions to allow people there better to formulate their own socio-economic development strategies typically presume the existence of a shared regional interestwhich is rarely if ever a valid assumption -and run the risk that the blame for continuing socio-economic development problems will thereby be shifted to the region and its inhabitants. What is needed is a rather different model and understanding of politics and practice that recognises that simply living in the same region does not confer identity of interest but also that in many regions the regional capacity to shift regional development trajectories onto a 'higher and better' path is strictly limited precisely because of their location within the structural relations of capitalist development. . moving towards a more even map of regional development will be -at besta long drawn out process, characterised by at least as many steps backwards and sideways as forwards in the search for a politics that both recognises and respects the right to regional identity and specificity while seeking to redress the material inequalities of regional uneven development and wrestles with the dilemmas of seeking to deal simultaneously with issues of recognition and redistribution (cf. FRASER, 1995) .
Indeed, recognising these enduring dilemmas, it is important to emphasise that there is not a single "high road" to which there is no alternative and to iii Clearly, there are major debates as to the precise meaning of contested terms such as sustainability and environmental and social justice but it is sufficient here simply to note that these are issues that need to be considered in thinking about development alongside narrower concerns with economic efficiency, productivity and growth rates. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
